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I. INTRODUCTION
Can an employer be found guilty of discrimination on
the basis of national origin when he imposes a rule of
English-Only in the workplace? Is it a proper defense that
the employee is bilingual and simply chooses to ignore the
employer's rule? Is it a proper defense that the particular
state has adopted an amendment to its constitution
establishing that English is the official language in that state?
First, all courts agree that English-Only rules in the
workplace are nondiscriminatory when there is a business
necessity.' However, up until April 22, 1988, when the Ninth
Circuit announced its decision in Gutierrez v. Municipal Court
of Southeast Judicial District,2 most courts, especially the Fifth
Circuit, had been using a rather flexible test to determine
business necessity.3
Second, until April 22, 1988, most courts, especially the
Fifth Circuit, have indicated that bilingual employees were not
deemed to have any protection.' In Garcia v. Gloor,5 the court
stated that, "neither the statute (the Civil Rights Act) nor
common understanding equates national origin with the
language that one chooses to speak ... ,"' However, in
Gutierrez, the Ninth Circuit decided that even bilingual
employees are protected from English-Only rules.!
Finally, the court in Gutierrez also ruled, on a matter
of first impression, that the recent California English-Only
1. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of Southeast Judicial District, 838 F.2d 1031, 1038 (9th
Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 861 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated and cert granted, 109 S. Ct.
1736 (1989).
2. id.
3. Id. at 1038.
4. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980), cern denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
5. Id.
6. Id. (emphasis added).
7. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1041.
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Amendment8 has no effect on cases involving English-Only
rules in the workplace.' In light of various adopted and
proposed constitutional amendments in other states, including
Florida,"° Gutierrez might become the beacon for those
representing individuals affected by "English-Only" rules in the
workplace. However as Asian American Business Group v.
City of Pomona" suggests, caution should be exercised as the
United States Supreme Court has vacated the judgment and
has granted certiorari in Gutierrez.
II. CONTENT AND LITATURE REVIEW
This article will examine the various administrative and
judicial decisions in connection with English-only rules in the
workplace. It does not address broader issues in connection
8. § 6 of the California Constitution provides the following:
(a) purpose: English is the common language of the United States of
America and the State of California. This section is intended to preserve,
protect and strengthen the English language, and not to supersede any
of the rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution.
(b) [E]nglish is the official language of the State of California.
(c) Enforcement: The Legislature shall enforce this section by
appropriate legislation. The Legislature and officials of the State of
California shall take all steps necessary to insure that the role of English
as the common language of the State of California is preserved and
enhanced. The Legislature shall make no law which diminishes or ignores
the role of English as the common language of the State of California.
(d) [Alny person who is a resident of or doing business in the State of
California shall have standing to sue the State of California to enforce
this action.
CAL. CONsT. art. Ill, § 6.
9. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1044.
40. Miami Herald, Mar. 6, 1988, at 1, col. 4, reported that the proposed Florida
constitutional amendment is as follows:
Section 9. OFFICIAL STATE LANGUAGE
(a) English is the Official Language of Florida.
(b) The Legislature shall have the power to to enforce this section by
appropriate legislation.
Id. at 22, col. 2. On November 8, 1988, 84% of the Florida voters voted to accept the
proposal. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1988, at B10, col 4. On July 3, 1989, the United States
Supreme Court rejected appeals by the Hispanic residents and let stand a ruling that the
official language statutes did not violate the Voting Rights Act. N.Y. Times, July 4, 1989,
at A14, col. 4.
11. 716 F. Supp. 1328 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
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with English-Only amendments to state constitutions which
have been extensively covered by other authors. t2
Two articles have covered English-Only rules in the
workplace through a discussion of discrimination on the basis
of national origin. 3 Another has concentrated on employer-
promulgated English-Only rules as well as the discriminatory
effect of English proficiency policies. 4 While the first two
articles are extensive treatises on Title VII, its procedural
aspects and the distinctions between the bona fide
occupational qualification ("BFOQ") and the business necessity
defenses available, neither author concentrates on the
development of the cases concerning employer-issued English-
Only rules in the workplace.IS In addition, at least one, if not
both, might have reached different conclusions had they
considered the amended Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") guidelines 6 in this area and Gutierrez.
M11. PROIIIlTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION ON TIE
BASIS ON NATIONAL ORIGIN UNDER TITLE VII OF
TIE CIL RIGiris Acr OF 196411
In the area of employment discrimination, and as it has
been applied to employer-issued English-Only rules, the
protection against discrimination emanates from the provisions
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964ts that make it unlawful to
12. See Leibowicz, The Proposed English Language Amendment: Shield or Sword?, 3
YALE L. & POLY REv. 518 (1985) and Note, "Official English": Federal Limits on Efforts to
Curtail Bilingual Services in the States, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1345 (1987).
13. Note, Language Discrimination Under Title VII: The Silent Right of National Origin
Discrimination, 15 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 667 (1982) [hereinafter Language Discrimination];
Note, Native-Born Acadians and the Equality Ideal, 46 LA. L. REv. 1151 (1986) [hereinafter
Native-Born Acadians].
14. Greenwood, Employer English-Only and English Proficiency Policies May be
Discriminatory, 62 FLA B.J.. April 1988, at 70 [hereinafter Employer English-Only].
15. See supra notes 12-13.
16. Speak-English-Only Rules, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1980).




discriminate against any individual in connection with his term
of employment on the basis of "national origin."t9 However,
the term "national origin" is not defined in the statute.'
While the statute does not define national origin, the
EEOC has indicated that Title VII is designed to reach
widespread practices of national origin discrimination as well
as many ethnically motivated overt (unintentional), as well as
covert (intentional), forms of discrimination."
It was established in Griggs v Duke Power Co.' that
Title VII protects against intentional as well as unintentional
discrimination. In Griggs, the Court held that a facially neutral
rule may still be discriminatory if it has a disparate impact on
protected individuals.' Therefore, while an English-Only rule
may be facially neutral, it may have a discriminatory impact.'
IV. BURDEN OF PROOF: BAsic
PROCEDURAL STEPS
As the courts distinguished between "intentional" and
"unintentional" discrimination, various types of defenses that
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1981) states that "It shall be ... unlawful . . . for an
employer to discriminate . . . against any individual with respect to his . . . terms ... of
employment ... because of ... national origin; or to limit ... his employees ... in any way
which would deprive ... or ... adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's . . . national origin .... " Id. (emphasis added). In addition to a claim under
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17, some courts have recognized a remedy under 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1981). For a discussion of a national origin claim under § 1981 and the difference
between a Title VII claim, see Native-Born Acadians; supra note 13; see generally B. SCHLEi
& P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw, 599-614 (1976) [hereinafter SCHLEI &
GROSSMAN].
20. Language Discrimination, supra note 13, at 675 n.33.
21. The original EEOC regulations in this area, Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1970), states that "[tihe Commission is aware of
widespread practices of discimination on the basis of national origin, and intends to apply
the full force of law to eliminate covert as well as the overt practices of discrimination...
Id. § (a) para. 931.
22. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
23. Id. at 436.
24. "Language requirements in employment, even if facially neutral, may be disciminatory
due to a disproportionately negative impact on a protected group." Language Discrimination,
supra note 13, at 676.
1990]
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
may be available under each have been formulated.'
Under both forms of discrimination, the burden of
proof shifts to the employer to prove that the discrimination
was lawful. Under intentional discrimination, the employer
must prove that his actions were necessary due to a BFOQ'
and under unintentional discrimination, the employer must
prove that his actions were due to a business necessity."
As overt discrimination is the worst of the two evils,
it is not surprising to find that it is easier to establish the
business necessity rather defense than the BFOQ defense."
A. The 1970 Guidelines and its Progenitors
The earliest of the EEOC's pronouncements in
connection with English-Only rules is entitled "Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of National Origin" ("Guidelines").'
As indicated earlier, the Guidelines state that Title VII
reaches overt and covert discrimination." It further provides
that English language tests may constitute "national origin"
discrimination both when English is not an employee's first
language and when English skills are not a requirement of
the job to be performed.3t
Following the 1970 Guidelines, three administrative
25. See generally SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at ch. 36.
26. Id. at 1147-58; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-06 (1973),
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976).
27. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at 1158-61; Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 273
(1976). Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of Southeast Judicial District, 838 F.2d 1031, 1039-40
(9th Cir. 1988). See also Language Discrimination, supra note 13, at 670-76; Employer English-
Only, supra note 13, at n.3.
28. See Language Discrimination, supra note 13, at 672 nn.22,24.
29. Purpose, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1 (1970).
30. Id. (The regulations set forth in this part 1601 contain the procedures established
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for carrying out its responsibilities in the
administration and enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Based upon its experience in the administration of the Act and upon its evaluation of
suggestions and petitions for amendments submitted by interested persons in accordance with




cases were decided involving employer enacted English-Only
rules in the workplace.32
1. EEOC Decision No. 71-44633
First, in one of the earliest cases, the EEOC extended
the definitions contained in the National Labor Relations
Act 3' to the Civil Rights Act of 196431 and equated an
English-Only rule with a denial of a term or condition of
employment. 6  The EEOC held that an English-Only rule,
barring the use of Spanish during working and non-working
hours, and directed solely against Spanish-surnamed
individuals, had the unlawful effect of discriminating on the
basis of national origin." The employer tried to use the
business necessity defense and the EEOC held that the
supervisors' failure to understand the employees' personal
conversations was not a business necessity." The Commission
found that any business necessity defense would not survive
scrutiny where the rule was extended to the employees'
non-working time?9
In extending the National Labor Relations Act
definitions to Title VII the Commission held that, "[i]t is now
well settled that conversation, including social conversation,
at work both during working and non-working time, is a term
or condition of employment within the meaning ... of the
National Labor Relations Act . ... "' The Commission
32. Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752 (D. Or. 1973); Saucedo v. Brothers Well
Service, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Ix. 1979); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
33. EEOC Decision No. 71-446, [1972] Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) para. 6173 (Nov. 5,
1970).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 167 (1935).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
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reasoned that the same should apply to the phrase "terms
and conditions of employment" used in Title VII.4  The
Commission concluded, "it follows, and we hold that it is a
term, condition, or privilege of employment for Spanish
surnamed Americans to speak Spanish at work ... ."2 The
Commission further indicated that the rule had the effect of
denying Hispanics a term, condition or privilege of
employment enjoyed by the other employees, "to converse
in a familiar language with which they are most comfortable
1143
2. EEOC Decision No. 72-02814
Similarly, in another action, the EEOC again held that
enforcement of a rule forbidding barbers to speak Spanish
during working hours was sufficient to constitute discrimination
on the basis of national origin. 4 There, the Regional
Director found that the firing of an employee was not due to
discrimination but due to the fact that he had filed a
complaint for back wages." However, the Commission
reversed the Regional Director's proposed opinion because it
concluded that a factor in the firing was actually the plaintiff's
violation of a long standing rule forbidding Spanish to be
spoken by Spanish surnamed Americans employees in the




44. EEOC Decision No. 72-0281, [1972] Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) para. 6293 (Aug. 9,
1971).
45. Id.




3. EEOC Decision No. 73-0377'
The last of the 1970 Guidelines EEOC cases was
decided in 1973. 41 The EEOC held that a union's policy of
requiring exclusive use of the English language was a
discriminatory practice." As Hispanics represented sixty-one
percent of the labor force in this case, the Commission held
that such a policy violated Title VII as it had a significant
adverse impact on the large number of Hispanic employees
that could not easily speak, read or write English."
In summary, by 1973, the EEOC decisions were broadly
equating written English-Only rules enacted by employers
with national origin discrimination." The Commission
believed that to converse during working hours, even in a
language other than English, was considered a term or
condition of employment. 3 Furthermore, it also held that
neither the failure of a supervisor to understand Spanish54 nor
the presence of non-Spanish speaking customers was
sufficient reason for the rule to constitute a business
necessity.5 This was especially true in cases where the
prohibition extended to nonworking hours, as they found it
hard to believe that business necessity would require that
employees speak only English during breaks.
48. EEOC Decision No. 73-0377, [19721 Empl. Prac. Dec (CCH) para. 6376 (Oct. 5,
1972).
49. Id.
50. Id. at para. 4701.
51. Id. at para. 4699.




55. EEOC Decision No. 72-0281, [19731 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) para. 6293 (Aug. 9,
1971).
56. EEOC Decision No. 71-446, [1973] Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) para. 6826 (July 6,
1981).
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B. The Pre-1980 Judicial Interpretations
The earliest federal case involving English-Only rules
was Hernandez v. Erlensbusch" which involved patrons, not
employees. 8 In 1973, the Oregon District Court ruled that a
tavern whose clientele was twenty-five percent
Mexican-American could not prohibit any foreign language
from being spoken on the premises because that would violate
the rights of Spanish speaking customers to buy,. drink and
enjoy what the tavern had to offer. 9
In Hernandez, the owner had ordered his bartenders to
enforce the following order: "Do not allow a foreign language
to be used at the bar, if it interferes with the regular trade. If
there should be a chance of a problem, ask the 'Problem'
people to move to a table and turn the juke box up ...."'
The owner of the tavern explained that the rule was to avoid
conflict and thus was in the best interest of the tavern's two
groups of customers, "Anglo and Chicano."'
Two Hispanic customers were told that if they
continued to speak Spanish, they would either have to move
away from the bar to a separate booth or leave the
establishment. ' When the customers complained, the
bartender took the Hispanics' drinks away and refused to
refund any money.' After the police were called, the
customers left peacefully.' Two days later the same scene
took place with different customers.' However this time, the
Hispanic customers were followed and assaulted by three
57. Hernandez v. Erlensbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752 (D. Ore. 1973).
58. Id. at 753.
59. Id. at 756.
60. Id. at 754.
61. Id. (denoting Caucasian and Mexican-American people). Apparently, in this case
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"regular" Anglo customers.'
The plaintiffs did not claim, nor did the court address,
any issues of discrimination on the basis of "national origin."
Instead, the plaintiffs alleged, and the court concluded that,
because the tavern had such a large Mexican-American
clientele, the prohibition on the use of any foreign language
was tantamount to racial discrimination and violated 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 and 1985.67
Citing Griggs,' the court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
1982 barred this type of patent discrimination against
Mexican-Americans who constituted one-fourth of the tavern's
66. Id.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 provides that "[a~ll citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by while citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) provides:
If two or more persons in any state or Territory conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose
of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the
constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing
to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the
laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation,
or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his
support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election
of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice
President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure
any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy;
in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons
engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the
object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or
property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of
a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have
an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or




Ilemandez, 368 F. Supp. at 755 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
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clientele.' The Oregon Circuit Court held that the application
of the rule "deprives Spanish-speaking persons of their rights
to buy, drink and enjoy what the tavern has to offer on an
equal footing with English-speaking customers . *. .. "' The
court equated the "back booth or out" order with the civil
rights issues in the lunchcounter and bus cases of the 1960's.7'
The Oregon Circuit Court found no difference between
ordering lunch at a diner or ordering beer at a bar in
claiming to preserve the peace when sending blacks to the
back of the bus or in sending Hispanics away from the bar
to a distant booth.7
The first case involving an English-Only rule in the
workplace reached federal court in 1979.' In Saucedo v.
Brothers Well Service Inc.,74 the Southern District Court of
Texas held that a Mexican-American employee could not be
discharged for simply speaking two words in Spanish, while
other employees who had committed far more serious offenses
had been retained.75
In an attempt to meet the requirements of a business
necessity defense, the defendant company presented evidence
concerning the danger involved in drilling wells and the need
to have close coordination among the members of the crew.76
In dicta, the court explained that an English-Only rule that
is "duly and officially promulgated [and] efficiently
69. See id
70. id.
71. Id. at n.7. See also Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963);
Lombard v. Louisiana; 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374
(1963); Avent v. North Carolina; 373 U.S. 375 (1963); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964);
Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964); Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280
F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
72. 1lemandez, 368 F. Supp. at 755.
73. id.
74. Saucedo v. Brothers Well Service, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
75. Id. at 922.
76. Id. at 920.
110 [Vol. VII
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communicated ... " would be reasonable in such a setting.'
While his non-Hispanic supervisor claimed that Saucedo
was told he would be dismissed if he violated the rule,78 the
facts indicate that Mr. Saucedo was not officially informed of
any English-Only policy.' Thus, the Southern District Court
of Texas held that Saucedo had neither notice of the rule nor
of the consequences for its violation.'
While the court had sufficient facts to rule for Saucedo
at this point, the court decided to weigh the setting in which
the forbidden act, the two words in Spanish, took place."' The
court held that the business necessity failed as a defense
because the Spanish utterances took place in a maintenance
shop when Saucedo asked a question of another
Mexican-American employee and not while he was working
at a dangerous well.'
However, all English-Only and Spanish utterances aside,
the turning point in Saucedo occurred due to the
circumstances surrounding the firing and not because of his
rights to be informed about the rule, or because the business
necessity was a "sham," but because the employer
discriminated against Saucedo. 3
At the time Saucedo was fired, an altercation ensued
between Saucedo's supervisor and another Mexican-American
77. Id. at 921.
78. "Doc" Holliday claimed in a deposition (he did not testify in person) that "[iln a very
vague manner, that Saucedo, like other 'Mesican' [sic] employees, was told that if he spoke
Spanish at any time on the job this would be tantamount to quitting and that as soon as they
uttered any words in Spanish at any time on the job, this would be the same as a resignation
...." Id. (emphasis added).
79. Instead, when his supervisor was driving Saucedo to work one morning, he said that
Doc Hotliday did not allow any "Mesican" [sic] talk. Id. at 921.
80. The court found Holliday's testimony suspect, that Mr. Saucedo's conversation with
his immediate supervisor was the only time Mr. Saucedo was told about any such rule, and
that he was not advised as to the consequences of failing to adhere to such rule. Id.
81. Id.
82. Mr. Saucedo was carrying a heavy metal part and asked another Mexican-American
where to place it. Saucedo's supervisor overheard the conversation and fired Saucedo on the
spot. Id.
83. Id. at 921.
1990]
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employee.' Of the three employees, Saucedo, who was not
involved in the actual fight, was the only one fired.' The
court concluded that the crucial discrimination took place
when Saucedo was fired for the harmless use of a Spanish
phrase while his supervisor, who got involved in a fist fight,
was not fired.' In addition, the court also reluctantly
recognized that the rule had a disparate impact on
Mexican-American employees.' It held that Saucedo was
discriminated against because the rule was not properly
adopted and because there was no business necessity for an
automatic termination under the circumstances.'
The opinion is comprised of several vague conclusions.
At worst, the opinion could be seen as an unabashedly clear
ruling to employers desiring to institute such rules as to the
circumstances under which they are permissible.9 The latter
conclusion is almost inevitable in light of the opening sentence
of the opinion: "[t]his opinion does not hold that an
employer, or this specific employer, may never institute a rule
prohibiting employees from speaking foreign languages in
some situations .... "90
It should be noted that in Saucedo, as in most of the
cases that preceded it, there was never an indication that the
plaintiffs had any difficulty in speaking English. Therefore,
all of the Spanish utterances and conversations in question to
date appeared to have been strictly a matter of personal
84. Upon hearing Doc Holliday fire Saucedo, Steve Perez said to Holliday that the
"English-Only" rule and Holliday were both "chicken." Id. at 922. Holliday then hit Perez
in the face a number of times while the owner of the company looked on. Id.
85. Id. at 920.
86. Id. at 922.
87. Id. "Most Anglo-Americans obviously have no desire and no ability to speak foreign
languages on or off the job." Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 919-20. After almost seven years from the date of his discharge, the court
finally awarded Mr. Saucedo two months pay at $2.40 per hour for a total of $896.00, plus
interest. Id. at 922. His attorney's request for 120 hours of work was cut to 70 hours and




Garcia v. Gloo" was the first employer mandated
English-Only rule case to reach a United States Court of
Appeals and one that extremely limited the freedom of
language.' Hector Garcia, a 24 year old bilingual, native-born
American of Mexican descent, alleged that he was fired" from
his sales job because of discrimination on the basis of
national origin in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2.Y At the
root of the alleged discriminatory act was an employer-
promulgated English-Only rule which applied to all sales
employees except those working outside the store and those
who had to communicate with Spanish-speaking customers."
In contrast to the prior cases, the rule did not apply to
conversations during work breaks ' and, in contrast to Saucedo,
the court indicated that this was not "a case where an
employee inadvertently slipped into using a more familiar
tongue .... ,,9 In fact, the Southern District Court of Texas
found that Garcia had violated the rule "at every opportunity
since the time of his hiring according to his own testimony.
." However, that did not mean that Garcia was properly
fired. First, the Texas District Court interpreted the language
of the statute.Y It reasoned that while the EEOC had an
informal policy indicating that English-Only rules discriminate
on the basis of national origin, it had neither adopted a
formal policy nor promulgated an official regulation."° Yet,
the Texas Southern District Court noted that "Garcia
91. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
92. Id.
93. Another Mexican-American Employee had asked Garcia, in English, whether an item





97. Id. at 270.
98. Id. at 266-67.
99. Id. at 268.
100. Id. at 268 n.1.
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contends, with support from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission [EEOC], that the rule violates the
EEO Act and the Civil Rights Act .... .""
Furthermore, the court's position that the Commission
had no formal policy or regulation is somewhat attenuated."°
While the earlier Guidelines did not refer to the use of
English-Only rules, they did state that examples of overt and
covert discrimination include "[t]he use of tests in the English
language where the individual tested came from circumstances
where English was not that person's first language or mother
tongue, and where English language skills is not a requirement
of the work to be performed .... "" As English-Only rules
are a constant job requirement, it may be argued that such
rules are de facto tests which the employee needs to pass in
order to mantain his employment.
Additionally, these early guidelines also indicated that
Title VII "protects all individuals, both citizens and
noncitizens . . . ."" Thus, there was no indication that a
citizen's bilingual ability may constitute an exception to this
rule especially when one considers that most, if not all,
bilingual United States citizens of Hispanic descent come
"from circumstances where English was not that person's first
language or mother tongue ....""
In any event, even though the EEOC's administrative
interpretations are entitled to great deference, 5  the court
proceeded to interpret the meaning of the prohibition against
101. Id. at 267.
102. See supra text accompanying note 51.
103. Purpose, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1(b) (1970).
104. Id. § 1606.1(c).
105. Id. § 1606.1(b).
106. Native Born Acadians, supra note 13, at 1157 n.33 (citing United States v. Chicago,
400 U.S. 8 (1970)). "While the EEOC guidelines are not binding on the courts, they 'do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgement to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance."' Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of South East Judicial Dist., 838
F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)
(quoting General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-142 (1976) (quoting in turn
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
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discrimination on the basis of national origin, ignoring the
EEOC's prior administrative opinions as well as any other
formal, internal or informal EEOC policy.1" Instead, it based
its decision solely on the statute itself and pertinent judicial
case law."°  In reaching the conclusion that Mr. Garcia's
Spanish utterances were not protected, the court narrowed
the EOCC interpretations of the 1970's and depended heavily
on its conclusion that "[n]either the statute nor common
understanding equates national origin with the language that
one chooses to speak .... 109
The court reasoned that:
[N]o authority cited to us gives a person a right
to speak any particular language while at work
.... [T]he rules of the workplace are made by
collective bargaining or ... by the employer. An
employer's failure to forbid employees to speak
English does not grant them a privilege (to
speak English) .... [If] the employer engages a
bilingual person, that person is granted neither
right nor privilege by the statute to use the
language of his personal preference ... 110
The logic is rather tenous. For instance, one unintended
message from Garcia is the uncomfortable conclusion that a
Hispanic-American employer could fire a bilingual, United
States born "Anglo" or a United States born
Hispanic-American who fails to obey a Spanish-Only rule in
the workplace.
The court also emphasized that, with the exception of
religion, the protected classes are those that exhibit
107. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981).
108. Id. at 268-69.
109. Id. at 268 (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 268-69.
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immutable characteristics which the individual cannot alter."'
However, the court reasoned that language is a mutable
characteristic.12  Thus, although the prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of national origin would protect
persons who were born or whose ancestors were born in a
foreign country, it would not protect bilingual individuals who,
when their employer prohibits use of any language other than
English on the job, decide to have a personal conversation in
a non-English language of their choice."'
In connection with the mutable characteristics of
language, an expert testified that "the Spanish language is
the most important aspect of ethnic identification for
Mexican-Americans, and it is to them what skin coloi is to
others . t4 However, that did not persuade the court in
any form.
Another author, while agreeing that English-Only rules
can be applied against bilingual employees who refuse to
speak English to English speaking customers, severely
criticized Garcia,"' claiming that "[t]he very nature of a 'Speak
English-Only' rule (except in safety circumstances) reeks of
xenophobia and misplaced 'Americanization.""'6 In any event,
in light of the court's theory, the question of discriminatory
impact was easily resolved. The court held that the rule did
111. Id. at 269 (citing Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084
(1975)).
112. See id. at 270 (the court stated that "[to] a person who speaks only one tongue
or to a person who has difficulty using another language than the one spoken in his home,
langauge might well be an immutable characteristic like skin, color, sex or place of birth.").
113. Id. at 272.
114. Id. at 267.
115. Native-Born Acadians, supra note 13, at 1167.
116. Id.
Hector Garcia was certainly not fired because he upset customers by
speaking Spanish -he was not within hearing distance of any customers.
Garcia was wrongfully discharged because he practiced his native tongue.
Such a situation unfortunately parallels the "Americanization" process in
Louisiana in the early twentieth century when educators, both Anglo and
Acadians, severely whipped and scorned Acadian boys and girls for




not have a disparate impact on Mr. Garcia as he was
completely bilingual and merely chose to speak Spanish
instead of English."'
It is important to note that Garcia was originally
instituted as a class action suit, but the court denied
certification."8 Had the court permitted the class action, then
it would have been forced to rule on the effect of the
English-Only rule against individuals that were not as fluent in
two languages as was Mr. Garcia.
The Saucedo opinion reflects dicta on the issue of
business necessity."9  In this case the appellate decision
relates, for no apparent reason, the holding of the judge of
this Southern District Court of Texas"2 regarding valid business
reasons for the English-Only rule and expounded that the
following motives, and not discrimination, were the basis for
the employer imposed rule:
English-speaking customers objected to
communications between employees that they
could not understand; pamphlets and trade
literature were in English and were not available
in Spanish, so it was important for employees to
be fluent in English apart from conversations
with English-speaking customers; if employees
who normally spoke Spanish off the job were
required to speak English on the job at all times
and not only when waiting on English-speaking
customers, they would improve their English;
and the rule would permit supervisors, who did
not speak Spanish, better to oversee the work of
subordinates.'
117. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 268.
118. Id. at 267.
119. Saucedo v. Brothers Well Service, inc., 464 F. Supp. 919, 922 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
120. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 267.
121. Id.
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Some of these "valid" business reasons may appear
suspect to some as one might question the customers' interest
in the employees' personal conversations, the incremental
benefit of the rule in helping employees read the trade
literature as they were hired with appropriate ability in the
English language to be salespeople, or the lack of Spanish
speaking supervisors.
C. The 1980 EEOC Guidelines:
The Message Against Garcia
During the last days of President Carter's
administration, on December 29, 1980, the EEOC extensively
amended its "national origin" guidelines." The Commission
defined "national origin discrimination broadly as including.
. . the denial of equal employment opportunity ... because
an individual has the . . cultural or linguistic characteristics
of a national origin group."'" Furthermore, the new
regulations specifically added 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 to indicate
the EEOC's policy in connection with English-Only rules?
4
The Commission said that it would presume that rules
requiring employees to speak English at all times are violative
122. Guidelines On Discrimination Because Of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § 1606
(1989).
123. Id. at § 1601.1.
Purpose. The regulations set forth in this part 1601 contain the
procedures established by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission for carrying out its responsibilities in the administration and
enforcement of Title VI1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Based upon its experience in the administration of the Act and upon its
evaluation of suggestions and petitions for amendments submitted by
interested persons in accordance with § 1601.35, the Commission may
from time to time amend and revise these procedures.
Id
124. Id. at § 1606.7(b) (When applied only at certain times. An employer may have a
rule requiring that employees speak only in English at certain times where the employer can
show that the rule is justified by business neccessity).
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of Title VII and would be strictly scrutinized."z However, no
such presumption exists when the rule is applied only at
certain times."z In the latter case, the rule would be justified
when the employer can show that it is required by business
necessities.27
Indicating its general disapproval for such rules,
especially blanket rules that prohibit the use of any language
other than English, the new EEOC's regulation states:
[T]he primary language of an individual is often
an essential national origin characteristic.
Prohibiting employees at all times . . . from
speaking their primary language or the language
they speak most comfortably, disadvantages an
individual's employment opportunities on the
basis of national origin. It may also create an
atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and
intimidation based on national origin which would
result in a discriminatory environment . . .
In addition, the Commission recognized that some
non-native bilingual people may inadvertently use their
125. See id. at § 1601.7(a) ('Therefore, the Commission will presume that such a rule
violates Title VII and will closely scrutinize it." Id).
126. Id. at § 1606.7(b).
127. Id. at § 1601.7(b) "The person claiming to be aggrieved has the responsibility to
provide the Commission with notice of any change in address and with notice of any
prolonged absence from that current address so that he or she can be located when necessary
during the Commission's consideration of the charge." Id
128. Id. at § 1606.7(a).
The primary language of an individual is often an essential national origin
characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all times, in the workplace, from
speaking their primary language or the language they speak most
comfortably, disadvantages an individual's employment opportunities on
the basis of national origin. It may also create an atmosphere of
inferiority, isolation and intimidation based on national origin which could
result in a discriminatory working environment.
19901 119
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primary language." Thus, the new regulation requires
employers implementing English-Only rules during certain
times only give notice to their employees of such prohibition
and the penalties for violating the rule. Failure to provide
the dual notice would be considered evidence of national
origin discrimination in the event that an employee is affected
for violation of the rule."3'
D. Post-1980 Judicial And
Administrative Interpretations
Within 12 months after the new Guidelines were
promulgated, four decisions were reported concerning
employer imposed English-Only rules.'32 However, only the
administrative EEOC decision applied the new EEOC
Guidelines to resolve these actions.'33 The other three involved
42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims which required evidence and proof of
discriminatory intent."
In Flores v. Hartford Police,"5 the District Court of
Connecticut held that the Hartford police academy's English-
Only rule was not enforced with the intent to discriminate on
129. Id. at § 1606.7(c) ("Notice of the rule. It is common for individuals whose primary
language is not English to inadvertently change from speaking English to speaking their
primary language." Id).
130. Id. ("'herefore, if an employer believes it has a business necessity for a speak-
English-Only rule at certain times, the employer should inform its employees of the general
circumstances when speaking only in English is required and of the consequences of violating
the rule." ld).
131. Id. at § 1601.7(c) ("If an employer fails to effectively notify its employees of the
rule and makes an adverse employment decision against an individual based on a violation of
the rule, the Commission will consider the employer's application of the rule as evidence of
discrimination on the basis of national origin." Id).
132. Flores v. Hartford Police Department., 25 FEP 180 (D.C. Conn. 1981); EEOC
Decision No. 81-25, [19821 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) para. 6,826 (July 6, 1981); Garcia v.
Rush Presbyterian, 660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981); Vasquez v. McAllen Bag & Supply Co.,
660 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1981), cen. denied, 458 U.S. 1122 (1982). For a discussion of these
decisions, see text accompanying notes 135-168.
133. See text accompanying note 142.
134. See text accompanying notes 135-147.
135. Flores, 25 FEP at 180.
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the basis of national origin. 3' An action was brought against
the city of Hartford claming that the city had discriminated
against police recruits based on their national origin.' In
order to show discriminatory intent, the plaintiffs presented
evidence that the English-Only rule extended to class breaks
and they were reprimanded for speaking Spanish in class. 3'
While the court noted the schism between Garcia"9 and
previous EEOC's decisions, this was not emphasized because
in Flores the rule was not attacked directly, but merely
offered as evidence of intentional discrimination. " In any
event, the court said that the rule was a necessary goal in
light of the need for policemen to be proficient in English
and that the rule was not enforced with the intent to
discriminate against the plaintiffs.'
The second case in 1981 was an EEOC administrative
decision, EEOC Decision No. 81-25,142 where a tailor shop
adopted the following order, "when you are on the payroll
all conversations will be in English. Either work and speak
English or work and don't talk . . . .""
The employer said that the order was temporary,
limited in scope, not enforced at all times, and when enforced
was only enforced within the shop and sales area."  The
Commission held that the prohibition was a burdensome term
and condition of employment in light of the then recently
136. Id. at 190.
137. Id. at 181.
138. Id. at 185-86.
139. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
140. Flores, 25 FEP at 187.
141. Id. at 186.
142. EEOC Decision No. 81-25, [1982] Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) para 6,826 (July 6,
1981).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 4956.
1990]
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
promulgated 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a).145 Furthermore, it held
that because the employer's reasons for the rule did not
amount to a valid "business necessity," the prohibition was a
violation of Title VII. t  The Commission said that the
problems presented by the employer could have been
alleviated by measures less obstrusive than an absolute
prohibition.47
In Garcia v. Rush Presbyterian,' the Seventh Circuit
felt that an overriding need for English proficiency among
hospital employees validated the adoption of an English-Only
rule.'49 While the plaintiffs' class claims were based both on
42 U.S.C. § 2000e t'S and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, t'~ evidence
concerning the English-Only rule was presented to prove the
Section 1981 claim.' Garcia brought an action against Rush-
Presbyterian Hospital alleging discrimination against Latinos
both individually and as a class.'53 Specifically, the charges
alleged that job applicants with Spanish surnames or Hispanic
ancestery were subjected to disparate treatment in
145. Speak-English-Only Rules, 29 CFR § 1606.7(a) states:
"en applied at all times. A rule requiring employees to speak only
English at all times in the workplace is a burdensome term and condition
of employment. The primary language of an individual is often an
essential national origin characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all times,
in the workplace, from speaking their primary language or the language
that they speak most comfortably, disadvantages an individual's
employment opportunities on the basis of national origin. It may also
create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation based on
national origin which could result in a discriminatory working
environment. Therefore, the Commission will presume that such a rule




148. Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian, 660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981).
149. Id. at 1222.
150. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2 (1964).
151. 42 U.S.C § 1981 (1870).
152. Garcia, 660 F.2d at 1219 (Perez was denied her transfer to the position of Lab
Laison Technician and was discriminatorily discharged, and Romeo was discriminatorily
refused to be hired.)




In this case, while the extent of the prohibition is not
clear, nearly all employees were required to speak and read
English.'55  Moreover, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that
because there were other employees whose language was not
English, the rule did not have a disparate impact on
Hispanics. 56
Furthermore, the court took judicial notice of the fact
that, as English is the most likely language to be used by
patients in the interior of a "supposedly English speaking
nation," large modern hospitals located in urban areas might
have problems because of staff members' inability to
communicate in English.'57 The court equated such hospitals
with the Tower of Babel'58 (a term used even more recently
in the defendant's argument in Gutierrez)."9  However, the
main reason the court ruled against the plaintiffs was that,
"[t]he ability to speak and read English . . . (was a) job
related requirement in ... a highly sophisticated medical
institution ...."160
In Vasquez v. McAllen Bag & Supply Co.,"' decided
within twelve months of the promulgation of the new EEOC
Guidelines,"2 the plaintiff alleged two grounds; the first under
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e was dismissed due to a jurisdictional
requirement"6 and the second under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981
required proof of specific discriminatory intent.'" In Vasquez,
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1223.
156. Id. at 1222.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of Southeast Judicial District, 838 F.2d 1031, 1042
(9th Cir. 1988).
160. Id.
161. 660 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1122 (1981).
162. 29 C.F.R. § 1606 (1989).
163. Vasquez, 660 F.2d at 687.
164. Id. at 688.
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the plaintiff alleged that McAllen Bag and Supply's
requirement that job applicants for truck driving positions
speak English in an area where 85% of the residents were of
Mexican-American origin and 60% were monolingual in
Spanish was discriminatory.'"
Mr. Vazquez, who did not speak English, was denied
employment by the defendant after he adopted a policy of
hiring only English speaking truck drivers.'" The Court held
for the employer because the employee failed to prove that
he was intentionally discriminated against.'67 In addition, the
Court appeared to have been persuaded by the employer's
business argument of the need to have drivers who speak
English and Spanish, not just Spanish, and by the fact that
the percentage of Mexican-Americans hired by the employer
was not affected by the new rule.'"
In 1983, both the courts and the EEOC had an
opportunity to state under what circumstances a "business
necessity" permits the limited use of an English only rule.'"
In Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co.,' non-English speaking
employees challenged the legality of Ward Cove's
requirements that certain jobs be filled only by English
speaking persons.'
In Atonio, the court ruled that an English-Only rule was
justified in light of danger to employees and consumers." In
Atonio, the plaintiffs' in question were employed on
ocean-going fishing vessels and at fish processing canneries. 3
165. Id. at 686.
166. Id. at 687.
167. Id. at 687-88.
168. Id. at 688.
169. Id.
170. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) para 34,437 (D.C.
Wash. 1983); decision on remand following 703 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1982); aff'd on other
grounds, 37 EPD para 35,483 (9th Cir. 1987).
171. Id.
172. Id. at para. 33,840.
173. Id. at para. 33,823.
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The court felt that the need for safety and public consumer
protection from botulism were sufficient business reasons to
overcome any disparate impact.74
In EEOC Decision No. 83-7,"75 the Commission
presented an appropriate and narrowly drawn English-Only
rule.76 It charged an oil refinery with discrimination against
Hispanics on the basis of national origin when it instituted an
English-Only Rule.' At first, the company had a very broadly
written rule 78 but four days after announcing it the company
amended the rule and narrowed it."
174. Id. at para. 33,840.
175. [19851 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) para. 6836 (April 20, 1983).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 7005.
178. The first rule was announced on August 14, 1981. It stated: "All company
communications are written and spoken in English - therefore, in the interest of safety and
in order to mantain good communications throughout the Plant, languages other than English
are prohibited during working hours." Id. at 7006 n.I.
179. The revised rule was announced on August 20,1981. The EEOC filed charges on
September 1, 1981, after this policy was announced. In this decision the court wrote:
As provided in the EEOC Guidelines, 29 CFR § 1606.7 (c):
[ilf an employer believes it has a business necessity for a speak-English-
only rule at certain times, the employer should inform its employees of
the general circumstances when speaking only in English is required and
of the consequences of violating the rule.
In accordance therewith the Refinery issues the following instructions:
To insure safe and efficient operations in the [name deleted] Refinery
terminal, laboratory and processing areas; and to insure that instructions
are understandable and accurately communicated, all employees are
required to speak only English while performing their job duties.
Furthermore, during emergency conditions all refinery employees shall
speak only English.
There are no language restrictions at any other times which would impact
personal freedom and cultures ....
Id. at n.2. See also 29 CFR § 1606.7(c):
Notice of the Rule. It is common for individuals whose primary language
in not English to inadvertently change from speaking English to speaking
their primary language. Therefore, if an employer believes it had a
business necessity for a speak-English-only rule at certain times, the
employer should inform its employees of the general circumstances when
speaking only in English is required and of the consequences of violating
the rule. If an employer fails to effectively notify its employees of the
rules and makes an adverse employment decision against an individual
based on a violation of the rule, the Commission will consider the
employer's application of the rule as evidence of discrimination on the
basis of national origin.
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The Commission concluded that the rule, as drawn,
came within the then recently announced EEOC guidelines'"
because the company stated that: employees in an oil
refinery's lab work with potentially dangerous substances;
that constant and open communication is needed to avoid
fires, explosions and other problems; and that, if there is an
accident, time is of the essence. 81
In Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corporation," the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the
employer in an action alleging race and discrimination on the
basis of national origin." Mr. Jurado, a bilingual radio
announcer of Mexican-American and Native-American
descent, sued his employer pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
2000e, alleging disparate treatment and disparate impact in
that he was fired for refusing to comply with an order
requiring him to stop speaking Spanish on the air."s At first,
Mr. Jurado had broadcasted in English only; then, at his
employer's request, he began using Spanish in an attempt to
attract a larger audience."s When marketing studies indicated
that the Spanish program was hurting the station, Mr. Jurado
was told to change back to an all English format."
With regards to the § 1981 claim, Jurado had to, but
could not prove that the radio station intended to discriminate
against him. 87 Instead, the court determined that the decision
to discontinue the Spanish format was a programming one
based on marketing surveys, ratings and demographics." In




182. 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
183. Id. 630 F. Supp. 569, 580 (C.D. Cal. 1985), afftd, 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
184. Id.
185. Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1406.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1409.
188. Id. at 1410.
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Jurado had voluntarily chosen to continue to speak Spanish,
deciding to ignore the rule as a matter of personal choice."
The court held that Jurado's disparate impact claim was not
warranted.'
In March 1984, in Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of
Southeast Judicial District9' the Southeast Judicial District of
the Los Angeles Municipal Court ("LAMC") banned the use
of any language other than English, except during times when
court employees were acting as translators."a
In response, Alva Gutierrez, a deputy court
clerk/translator, challenged the rule alleging that it denied
equal protection and free speech which constituted racial and
national origin discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Specifically, she requested, and was
granted, a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement
of the rule. LAMC appealed to the Ninth Circuit."9 Four
months after its original announcement, the rule was
amended to permit employees to use the language of their
choice during breaks or lunchtime."M
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed Gutierrez's Title
VII challenge to determine whether the injunction was
properly issued."9 In order to do that, the court had to
determine Gutierrez's likelihood of success and the existence
of irreparable injury." First, the court approached the issue
of discrimination under disparate impact." The opinion of
the court said:
189. Id. at 1411.
190. Id. at 1412.
191. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of Southeast Judicial District, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th
Cir. 1988).
192. Id. at 1036.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1037.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1038-40.
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In the United States, persons of Asian and
Hispanic origin constitute large minorities.
Numerous members of these groups regularly
communicate in a language other than English
... [They] have made great contributions to the
development of our diverse multicultural society
. . .. The multicultural character of American
society has a long and venerable history ...
Commentators generally agree ... that language
is an important aspect of national origin ...
The cultural identity of certain minority groups
is tied to the use of their primary tongue ...
The mere fact that an employee is bilingual does
not eliminate the relationship between his
primary language and the culture that is derived
from his national origin. . . . Although an
individual may learn English and become
assimilated into American society, his primary
language remains an important link to his ethnic
culture and identity .... Because language and
accents are identifying characteristics, rules which
have a negative effect on bilinguals . . . may be
mere pretexts for national intentional origin
discrimination. 19
Recognizing that Title VII does not address
English-Only rules, the court reviewed the EEOC's latest
guidelines on the subject.'" The court quoted from 29 C.F.R.
§ 1606.7(a) which provides that: "[t]he primary language of
an individual is often an essential national origin
characteristic."' It quoted another author that stated,
"language identification is extremely important in adhering to
one's national origin. Since the French language is the
198. Id. at 1038-39.




nucleus of Acadian people any employment rule which
severely curtails the use of French by Acadians should be
carefully scrutinized . .. .201
In addition, the court indicated its agreement with the
EEOC that, "an English-Only rule is . . . a burdensome
condition of employment that is often used to mask national
origin discrimination and that must be carefully scrutinized
'1202
In that light, the court proceeded to evaluate LAMC's
argument that according to Garcia, there is no disparate
impact because Gutierrez is bilingual and can easily comply
with the rule. 3 Thus, LAMC argued that if Gutierrez does
not want to obey the rule, it is merely a matter of a personal
preference or choice.' In reply, the court stated that, "for
the reasons already given [e.g. those mentioned above], we do
not think an English-Only rule can so easily be immunized
from judicial scrutiny . . .
With those simple words, the Ninth Circuit created a
conflict within the circuits. On one hand, the Fifth Circuit
indicated in Garcia that bilinguals have no Title VII
protection against English-Only rules 101a and, on the other
hand, the Ninth Circuit stated that Title VII protection for
bilinguals cannot be so easily discarded.' The court
recognized that it had used the Garcia holding in its recent
Jurado decision to rule that a bilingual disc jockey did not
suffer disparate impact from being fired for refusing to stop
using Spanish on the airwaves.' However, the court
distinguished the cases by stating that, "[d]espite our
reference to Garcia, the determinative issue in Jurado was not
201. Native Born Acadians, supra note 13, at 1166.
202. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039-40.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1040.
206. Id at 1045.
207. Id. at 1041.
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the fact that Jurado was able to comply with the rule; it was
that the employer had the right to insist that the broadcast be
conducted exclusively in English .... "
Furthermore, the court emphasized that in Jurado, the
prohibition was very limited to the words being uttered by
one single person into a microphone during a radio show.'
It did not extend to Jurado's off-the-air conversations.10
Instead, the employer's rule was used solely to control the
product being provided to its listeners and not to control
Jurado's off-the-air conversations. 1' The rule in Jurado is a
far cry from the one promulgated by LAMC which attempted
to control the work and non-work related conversation of
hundreds of employees.12
Once the court found that the LAMC rule had a
disparate impact on Gutierrez as well as many other
employees, the court had to determine whether the issuance
of the rule was warranted under the test of business
necessity. 13 In language indicating the intensity of the inquiry,
the court said that "[t]he justification must be sufficiently
compelling to override the discriminatory impact .... [T]he
rule must effectively carry out the business purpose it is
alleged to serve and there must be available no acceptable
less discriminatory alternative.""2 '  LAMC's justifications and
the court's responses were as follows:
1. LAMC stated that the United States is an
English speaking country and California an
208. Id. at 1041 n.13.
209. Id. at 1041.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Instead, "the prohibition on intra-employee communications in Spanish is sweeping
in nature and has a direct effect on the general atmosphere and environment of the work
place." Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1041-42. 'The practice must be essential, the purpose compelling." Id. (citing
Williams v. Colorado Springs School District No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981)).
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English speaking state."5  But the court
responded that the rule does little when the
employees are required to speak in Spanish and
translate for users of the court system.""
2. LAMC argued that the rule is necessary to
prevent the courthouse from turning into a
"Tower of Babel.""21 Apparently this term was
borrowed from Garcia v. Rush-Prebysterian,"'
where the court equated a large modern urban
hospital with the Tower of Babel.219 As Gutierrez
indicated, the use of such a term assumes that
the use of Spanish between employees is
disruptive per se. Since the courthouse is
already conducting business in Spanish, not
complying with the rule should not create that
much more of a disruption."1
3. LAMC stated that the rule promotes racial
harmony as the rule would prevent Spanish
speaking employees from criticizing non-Spanish
speakers with impunity.' The court noted that
there was no evidence that there was any
criticism.2" Instead there were affidavits
indicating that hearing employees converse in
Spanish made non-Spanish speaking supervisors
nervous. The court stated that this may be a
215. See id. at 1042.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian, 660 F.2d 1217 (1981).
219. Id. at 1222.




224. Id. at n.15.
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reflection of supervisors' prejudices towards a
language they could not understand as well as a
bias against Hispanic-Americans.' Furthermore,
the adoption of the rule would tend to promote
racial hostility.' The court noted that there had
been various racially discriminatory remarks
directed at Hispanics following the announcement
of the rule. 7
4. As in Garcia, LAMC argued that many
supervisors could not understand Spanish and
could not determine whether the employees
were advising the public properly.' The court
quickly responded that the argument is at best
disingenuous.'m As workers were requested to
communicate in Spanish with the public, the
rule would only help the supervisors understand
intra-employee conversations.' The court
suggested that the problem could be easily
solved by hiring more Spanish-speaking
supervisors. 1
5. Finally, LAMC argued that the rule is required
by the recent English-Only Amendment to the
California Constitution.' The court responded
that the amendment does not specifically call for
such a rule nor that any rule should be the
general policy of the state. 3 While the legislature
225. Id.
226. id.
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might be able to specifically design legislation at
some future time, for now, the Amendment is
merely a symbolic statement.' In addition,
LAMC alleged that the ballot initiative indicated
an intention to require that all communication
in government buildings be conducted in
Spanish. 5 The court responded that even if that
were true, the intent was to reach official
communications 36  and not private
communications. The rule in question is clearly
designed to reach only private conversations;
official communications in Spanish are already
sanctioned and required. 7 Finally, the court said
that existence of the Amendment alone does not
justify the business necessity test in Title VII,
unless the Amendment itself meets the test.'
In summary, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the California District Court's preliminary injunction
as the English-Only order is likely to succeed on an adverse
impact claim without meeting the business necessity test. 9
The court also agreed that Gutierrez would be subject to
irreparable injury and ruled on whether LAMC's judges were
subject to discovery.'" Finally, the court declared suspect two
exceptions indicated by the district court.' The lower court
stated that the rule may be- imposed if there were public
relations concerns. ' However, the appellate court alerted the
234. Id. at 1044 (citing CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6(a)); Cf. Puerto Rican Organization
for Polititcal Action v. Kusper, 490 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1973).
235. See id. at 1043.
236. Id. at 1044.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1044-45.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1045.
241. id.
242. Id. at n.21.
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parties that "public relations concerns" would not meet the
business necessity test.243 As the Gutierrez case shows, not
only private but public administrators as well must be leary
of imposing rules that might affect the Title VII rights of
employees." In light of well settled judicial precedents, there
was no excuse for the broad language in the original English-
Only rule in Gutierrez.24
However, Gutierrez did not end there. On November
23, 1988, the Gutierrez panel denied a petition for rehearing."
Furthermore, prompted by a suggestion for a rehearing en
banc, the panel submitted the issue to the other appellate
judges for a vote. As a majority of those appellate judges
declined to vote for a rehearing en banc, the suggestion was
rejected.247 Then on April 17, 1989, the United States
Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari and
a motion by the United States English Foundation, Inc., to file
a brief as amici curiae.'
In addition to granting certiorari, the Court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals
with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot. 9 Pursuant to
that directive, on May 18, 1989, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the Gutierrez opinion,
dismissed the appeal as moot, and instructed the district court
to dismiss its original judgment."
In United States v. Munsingwear,"' the United States
had filed a two-count complaint asking for an injunction and
for treble damages respectively against Munsingwear, Inc.,
based on alleged violations of price regulation. After the
243. Id. at 1045-46.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1048-49.
246. Gutierrez, 861 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1988).
247. Id. at 1188.
248. Gutierrez, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989).
249. Id
250. Gutierrcz, 873 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1989).
251. 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
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parties agreed to hold the treble damages count in abeyance
pending resolution of the injunction issue, the district court
held that the company's prices complied with the regulation
and dismissed the injunction.52 While an appeal was pending,
the price of the commodity was decontrolled and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dismissed the
appeal for mootness 3 The United States acquiesced that the
decision as it made no motion to vacate the judgment. A
denial to vacate the judgment could have been appealed to
the United States Supreme Court but the government never
pressed the issue. 4
The company then moved the District Court to dismiss
the treble damages count alleging that, as the denial of the
injuction was unreversed on appeal, it became res judicata to
the second count. The motion to dismiss the second count
was granted and, on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court also affirmed. Apparently
prompted by the fact that the commodity price had been
decontrolled during the appeal of the denial for an injunction,
the Court stated that:
[T]he established practice of the Court in dealing
with a civil case from a court in the federal
system which has become moot while on its way
here or pending our decision on the merits is to
reverse or vacate the judgment below and
remand with a direction to dismiss. . . . That
procedure clears the path for future religitigation
of the issues .... 255
If one assumes the Gutierrez was moot, a traditional
application of Munsingwear will indeed require dismissing the
252. Id. at 37.
253. Id
254. Id at 40.
255. Id at 39.
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appeal and vacating the judgment. But was Gutierrez moot?
As in other similar situations, the order of the Supreme Court
did not explain why it considered the case mootY
In any event, as Gutierrez is vacated what, if any, is its
effect? First, the Supreme Court did grant certiorari and
apparently it will eventually make a ruling as to whether there
are any constitutionally protected rights to speak a language
or to demand that a given language be spoken. However, in
the meantime, the decision stands as a beacon for a person's
primary language being intricately intertwined with that
person's national origin as well as with other socio-cultural
needs that identify that person as an individual member of a
particular race or of a national group.
That is exactly how Gutierrez was used in Asian
American Group v. City of Pomona. 7 In Asian American, the
attack against the use of one's language was moved from a
prohibition of its spoken form to a prohibition against its
written form. There, the City of Pomona, California, had
enacted an ordinance requiring commercial establishments that
advertise in a foreign language to devote at least 50 percent
of the sign to English alphabetical characters. 8 However, in
concluding that the ordinance violated freedom of speech, due
process and equal protection, the court held that "[a] person's
primary language is an important part of and flows from
his/her national origin ... [and] ... choice of language ...
is an expression of culture. .. .
While both were vacated decisions, the court carefully
used the analysis of Gutierrez and Olagues to strike down the
ordinance. It stated that:
Olagues v. Russoniello.. ., vacated on the ground
of mootness.. .; and Gutierrez v. Municipal Court
256. See Russoniello v. Olagues, 108 S. Ct. 52 (1987).
257. 716 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
258. Id at 1329.
259. Id at 1330.
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of the Southeast Judicial District..., vacated on
the ground of mootness,... effectively addresses
language regulation and its relationship to
national origin. Although this court does not rely
on these cases as precedent, this court does
agree with their rationale and their analysis...
260
It should be noted that none of the rules questioned in
all the cases reviewed here made a reference to "national
origin." The rules required to speak English only or, as in
Asian American, to advertise in English. However, as Asian
American indicates, if these restrictions are not equated with
national origin discrimination, employers as well as government
units could avoid heightened scrutiny of discriminatory laws
that restrict those who use foreign languages.
V. CONCLUSION
While English-Only rules have been attacked as
indications of intentional and unintentional discrimination,
employees have been successful in proving the latter. 1 In
these cases, English-Only rules have been found to be
permissible where there is a business necessity in a specific
work area and when the rule and the penalties for its violation
have been effectively communicated to the employees.' Yet,
the degree of scrutiny that a court undertakes when
determining whether a business necessity exists fluctuates. The
Fifth Circuit has traditionally used a relatively relaxed form
of scrutiny,' but more recently, the Ninth Circuit used a more
260. d
261. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
262. Saucedo v. Brothers Well Service, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919, 921 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
263. Garcia v. Floor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981). See Gutterrez v. Municipal Ct. of Southeast Judicial Dist., 838 F.2d 1031, 1038 (9th
Cir. 1988).
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demanding test.' The difference of opinion is evident when
the two courts disagree as to whether the ability of supervisors
and customers to understand the social conversations in
Spanish of employees constitutes a business necessity.'
However, courts generally agree that an English rule
may constitute a business necessity when the rule is needed to
protect the health and welfare of the public.' Likewise, it is
clear that a rule that forbids the use of a language other than
English during non-working hours is not permissible. "
Furthermore, there is a conflict between the Ninth and
Fifth Circuits as to whether bilingual employees are entitled
to any protection against these rules.' It is clear that the
Fifth Circuit courts are willing to deny disparate impact to
the Hispanic-American where the individual is bilingual having
equated the inherent need for, desire of, and socio-cultural
fusion with his linguistic roots with the mutable characteristics
of haircuts and mode of attire.' In ruling that language is a
matter of choice, these courts have tiptoed around some
deserving claims of discrimination on the basis of national
origin. Furthermore, the courts in the Fifth Circuit have
comparatively relaxed opinions regarding the scope and
intensity of the test of the business necessity defense. 7 None
of the tests undertaken by the Fifth Circuit cases compare to
the business necessity test in Gutierrez.7' In addition, various
cases in the Fifth Circuit appear to have used dicta extensively
to indicate what they would accept as business needs.
By adopting a policy that English-Only rules may have
264. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of Southeast Judicial District, 838 F.2d 1031, 1038
(9th Cir. 1988).
265. See Garcia, 618 F.2d at 269; see also Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039-1040.
266. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1038.
267. EEOC Decision No. 71-446, [1973] Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) para. 6826 (July 6,
1981).
268. See Garcia, 618 F.2d at 270; see also Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1040-41.
269. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 269.
270. Id. at 271.
271. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1041-42.
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a disparate impact on bilingual as well as monolingual
employees, Gutierrez redefined the parameters of English-Only
rules in the workplace.2" However, in light of the fact that
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari, we will have to wait
to see whether the boundaries being drawn by the Ninth
Circuit in Gutierrez and in Asian American will survive or
retreat to the boundaries established by the Fifth Circuit.
272. Id at 1031.
